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Abstract 
The relationship between governance and the performance of Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) is discussed in this paper. MFI performance encompasses both financial performance 
and outreach. Good governance in terms of strengthening stewardship, achievement of MFIs’ 
primary objectives and promoting further development of the industry have been asserted as 
key elements of the literature pertaining to MFI performance. Similarly, several cases 
concerning poor governance have been analysed.  
Good corporate governance has been noted as even more important due to the demand for 
transparency and accountability of funds utilised in the microfinance activities. Further, MFIs 
need to have a solid governance framework to minimise the possibilities of management 
failures which may jeopardise the efficacious application of received funds from governments 
and donors.  
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In prior studies, the nature of corporate governance practised by MFIs is less understood and 
no substantive work using multiple MFI outcomes over a number of years has been 
undertaken. The concerns raised in reviews of individual MFIs and normative discussions of 
what should constitute best practice do point to the need for better understanding of the 
nature of corporate governance practised by the MFIs and also, to understand the nature of 
the relationship that exists between institutional success and corporate governance especially 
for developing countries. This study therefore identifies and provides a framework for 
undertaking corporate governance research relating to MFIs. 
 
Keywords: Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), Corporate Governance Practices, Financial 
Performance, Outreach. 
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1. Introduction  
Economist and financial practitioners emphasize that the development of financial service 
sector is a major factor for the economic development of a country and economic well-being 
of people as it supports people to smooth their income, increase their investment 
opportunities and impacts the social, economic and political environment of that country 
(Calderón & Liu, 2003; Claessens, 2006; Erdal, Oguzhan, & Ahmet, 2011; Houssem & 
Hassene Ben, 2011; Jeanneney, Hua, & Liang, 2006; King & Levine, 1993). Therefore, it is 
needed for a country to have sound financial system to offer appropriate access for people to 
obtain money for the improvement of their living standard. However, there are millions of 
people persist without having access to financial services, especially in developing countries 
and therefore the demand for financial services surpass the available supply (Barr, Kumar, & 
Litan, 2007; Gobezie, 2005; Kathryn, 2005).  
The microfinance has directed to change all that by building financial market to meet diverse 
financial needs of under-served people (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2004; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2011) and emerged merely with the objective of alleviating poverty, especially in 
developing countries (Brau, Hiatt, & Woodworth, 2009; Daley-Harris, 2006). In developing 
countries, the formal banking sector serves only around 20 per cent of the population and rest 
of them cater by MFIs (Berenbach & Churchill, 1997; Robinson, 2001). Through the 
emerging awareness of the microfinance industry in recent years, it has been boost up and as 
a result the number of MFIs has risen markedly from 618 in 1997 to 3 133 in 2005 
(Daley-Harris, 2006). Further, it is estimated that around 10 000 MFIs existed in 2007 issuing 
loans in the world (Ming-Yee, 2007). 
Consequently, foreign capital investments (both debt and equity) in this industry has grown 
more than tripled to USD 4 billion (Reille & Forster, 2008) between 2004 and 2006. At the 
end of 2010, these investments have quadrupled and were calculated to be valued at USD 13 
billion (Reille, Forster, & Rozas, 2011). According to Consultative Group of Assist the Poor 
(CGAP, 2004) approximately 90 per cent of one billion USD of MFI funds are mainly from 
the taxpayers of the developed countries. However, investors, creditor, donors and others 
stakeholders like employees, clients and governments are now demanding for transparency 
and accountability of funds utilised in the microfinance activities. Besides, Global financial 
crisis that started in 2007 has reduced the funding availability to MFIs and donations become 
more difficult to obtain where this increases the pressure to show performance and due 
diligence (Brown & Gladwell, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012; Van 
Gool, Verbeke, Sercu, & Baesens, 2012). Any MFI that neglects adequate control and 
monitoring may suffer loss of reputation and face increased challenges in terms of achieving 
a sustainable position in the industry (Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009; Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Lapenu & Pierret, 2006; Sinclair, 2012). 
2. Objective of the Study  
According to the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI, 2008) and other 
researchers (Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Rock, 
Otero, & Saltzman, 1998) the nature of corporate governance practiced by MFIs are less 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 4 
understood and no substantive work using multiple MFI outcomes over a number of years has 
been undertaken. This indicates that there is an emerging consensus to conduct more studies 
on corporate governance of MFIs to analyse the relationship between institutional success 
and corporate governance especially for developing countries. The objective of this study is 
to identify the relationship between governance and performance of MFIs. MFI performance 
comprises both financial performance and outreach. This paper pursues direction from the 
prior studies and recommends significant corporate governance practices for MFIs, which can 
be used as an alternative approach to enrich their financial performance and outreach. This 
paper argues that the MFIs which maintain good corporate governance practices will be 
financially and socially sustainable. 
3. Significance of the study  
Prior studies conducted in different industries and sectors shows that good corporate 
governance practices has leads to improved financial performance in companies (Brickley, 
Coles, & Terry, 1994; Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998; Hossain, Cahan, & Adams, 2000). In MFI performance literature, good governance 
have been emphasised as the key elements for strengthening stewardship, achieving MFIs’ 
primary objectives and promoting further development of the industry (CSFI, 2008; Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Gant, de Silva, Atapattu, & Durrant, 2002; Hartarska, 
2005; Labie, 2001; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Rock et al., 1998; van Greuning, Gallardo, & 
Randhawa, 1998).  
In addition, some MFI studies point out that the poor governance leads to the poor financial 
performance and outreach (Aboagye & Otieku, 2010; Bassem, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008). Prior studies in MFI area 
descriptive or normative about what ought to be done. Elsewhere in the finance literature, 
empirical studies using micro-econometrics have considered in this study to analyse the 
economic behaviour of firms. The concerns raised in reviews of individual MFIs and 
normative discussions of what should constitute best practice do point to the need for better 
understanding of the nature of corporate governance practised by the MFIs and also, to 
understand the nature of the relationship that exists between institutional success and 
corporate governance especially for developing countries. In this paper a proposed method is 
described. The advantages of the approach and consequential contribution are noted. 
4. Literature Review  
In the microfinance literature, governance first appeared in 1997 and emphasised the 
relationships between boards of directors and the management of MFIs (Lapenu & Pierret, 
2006). Further, existing literature emphasises the importance of corporate governance for the 
microfinance sector as it is a significant factor for enhancing the viability of the industry 
(Hartarska, 2005; Labie, 2001; Mersland, 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Varottil, 2012). 
Kirkpatrick and Maimbo (2002, p. 293) pointed out that “Five years after the notable paper 
by Berenbach and Churchill (1997) on microfinance regulation and supervision, the 
appropriate level of government-supplied regulation in the industry remains unclear. 
Although subsequent studies have successfully identified the basic options available to 
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regulators, namely, no regulation, self-regulation, existing banking regulation, and special 
regulations, the literature has yet to establish a clear set of core principles which national 
regulators can translate into specific performance benchmarks, guidelines, rules and 
regulations” .  
Most previous studies in this area are related to consultancy reports and general guidelines on 
governance. These guidelines and consultancy reports are usually applied to all industries, 
though some of the guidelines are given for the specific industry. However, general 
guidelines on corporate governance have not been put into practice by MFIs (Arthur, Garvey, 
Swan, & Taylor, 1993; Mersland, 2009). Besides, general guidelines for corporate 
governance are not adequate for MFIs as there are cultural and regional differences that 
require the development of a specific framework for corporate governance (Gant et al., 2002). 
Varottil (2012) stated that MFIs need a specific corporate governance framework even when 
they are examined through a theoretical perspective.  
As stated by Labie (2001), an agency costs’ framework can be applied to the microfinance 
sector and he emphasised outreach performance rather than financial performance should be a 
priority for MFIs. This is highly important for MFIs compared with traditional firms in terms 
of assessing their corporate governance. However, Mersland and Strøm (2009) stated that an 
agency cost framework couldn’t be applied to MFIs to deal with the relationship between 
financial performance and outreach. In the microfinance sector, the corporate governance 
issues are subjected to a different set of factors that successfully target the core of the 
relationship between financial performance and outreach. Further, they examined the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in MFIs by using secondary 
data of third-party rating agencies and suggested that there is a relationship between MFI 
performance and governance. 
Bassem (2009) used a self-conducted survey, annual reports and mixed market data for his 
study on governance and performance of MFIs in Mediterranean countries and highlighted 
that governance mechanisms can improve the performance of Euro-Mediterranean MFIs in 
relation to outreach and sustainability. Lapenu and Pierret (2006, p. 10) conveyed that the 
“good functioning” of the board of directors is not enough to guarantee the success of MFIs. 
Other governance mechanisms probably play a more important role. It is necessary to 
broaden the scope of study to include all stakeholders involved (employees, managers, 
elected officials, clients, donors, bank partners, shareholders, the government, etc.) as well as 
any organisational form with a “governing” role that may have been set up at the inception of 
the institution . Mersland (2011) recommends in his study that stakeholders like donors, 
depositors, local communities and bank associations can provide a monitoring system to 
boost the existence of MFIs. 
However, the increasing popularity of microfinance as a development and anti-poverty tool 
has pushed the industry towards financial self-sufficiency and created a tension between the 
MFI’s dual mission of financial self-sufficiency and social orientation (Sinclair, 2012). 
Furthermore, Varottil (2012) and Sinclair (2012) points out that the commercialisation of 
MFIs from non-profit institutions to for-profit institutions has created several issues in the 
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industry. Even if the commercialisation of MFIs has assisted in scalability and outreach by 
broadening the scope of financial support for poor people, it has caused MFIs to turn back 
their social goals. According to Arena (2012), at present microfinance providers face a 
problem of drifting away from their mission and it is conceived as a problem of corporate 
governance, because the existing corporate governance practices available to MFIs are only 
influencing their ability to raise capital and that has created a perception that private interests 
are benefiting from the vulnerability of the poor.  
It is necessary to find out to what extent corporate governance pays attention to the interests 
of the poorer sections of society as stakeholders (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Through the 
application of social corporate governance, MFIs can pay more attention to the poor 
stakeholders and mitigate the problem of getting away from the mission. As Arena (2012, p. 
269) stated, “Unlike traditional corporate governance mechanisms, the social corporate 
governance is designed to vindicate the organisation's social and development goals. The 
social corporate governance mechanisms, when properly balanced against traditional 
corporate governance structures, alleviate the tension between financial and social 
development goals and provide a solution to mission drift in microfinance”. By shifting from 
financial aspects of governance, it is timely and important to focus on social aspects of 
governance to identify the appropriate corporate governance mechanisms for MFIs. The 
financial feasibility of MFIs can develop by having a rational approach toward financial 
objectives (Mersland, 2011). 
5. Corporate Governance for MFIs 
Even though many studies have been conducted to identify relationship between corporate 
governance practices and firm performance, there are limited scholarly studies conducted for 
the microfinance industry in relation to corporate governance. The empirical analysis of good 
corporate governance practices in relation to MFIs is still at an immature stage and it is 
important to conduct more studies in this field to enhance MFIs’ development (Bassem, 2009; 
Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, 2005, 2009; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland, 2009; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2009). However, there is plenty of empirical evidence in the financial 
literature that supports the view of good corporate governance enhances the performance of a 
firm. The same rationale recommends that good governance practices of MFIs would enhance 
their performance and reduce risk. Therefore, it is important to examine the empirical 
evidence of corporate governance mechanisms that improves firm performance. 
The previous studies done by different scholars have recognised certain aspects, such as 
board composition and characteristics, and their impact on firm performance (Bhagat & 
Black, 1999; Daily & Dalton, 1997; Kula, 2005; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). They revealed many factors to measure 
the corporate governance practices of a firm, such as number of directors/non-executive 
directors, board diversity, board size, director ownership, board compensation, 
CEO/chairman duality, education qualifications of board members, performance assessment 
of board, number of board meetings, debt and dividends (Bathula, 2008; Bhagat & Black, 
1999; Daily & Dalton, 1997; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006; 
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Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Roberts et al., 2005; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Solomon, 2004). 
A number of studies have also investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and organizational performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Pearce & Zahra, 1989; 
Rose, 2007; Wan & Ong, 2005). 
5.1 Board Diversity 
In recent years, the phrase board diversity has become entrenched in the corporate 
governance vocabulary. The Alliance for Board Diversity in 2010 found that 72.9 per cent of 
directorships in Fortune 100 companies were held by white men and the rest were held by 
minorities and women. The board diversity concept suggests that boards should reflect the 
structure of society and properly represent the gender, ethnicity and professional backgrounds 
of those within it. Boards of directors in a company are concerned to have the right 
composition to provide diverse viewpoints (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Board diversity 
supports on the basis of moral obligation to shareholders, stakeholders and for commercial 
reasons (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Kasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1997; Mattis, 2000).  
Gender diversity is considered part of the broader conception of board diversity (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996) and many scholars (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Walt 
& Ingley, 2003) have shown that few women sit on corporate boards. Even though Daily, 
Certo, and Dalton (2000) found similar results in USA, they also found that women’s 
representation on boards is gradually increasing. Most women directors are not from the 
corporate sector but are usually outsiders or non-executive directors (Hillman, Cannella, & 
Harris, 2002). When compared to men, most women directors possess staff/support 
managerial skills, such as legal, public relations, human resources and communications rather 
than operating and marketing skills. 
However, gender is one of the most discussed issues, not only in the corporate governance 
research but also in political and societal environments. Several scholars have empirically 
tested the consequences of women directors on firm performance (Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Fields & Keys, 2003; Smith, Smith, & Verner, 2006). 
According to Smith et al. (2006), women directors on boards have a significant positive 
impact on firm performance. Carter et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. In the MFI context, Bassem (2009) noted that board diversity 
with a higher percentage of women enhanced MFI performance.  
Based on the indication given by many empirical studies, it is important to further explore the 
impact of gender diversity of boards on MFI performance as it leads to better corporate 
governance, and provides diverse viewpoints, values and new ideas to the boards and 
provokes lively boardroom discussions (Burke, 1997; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006; Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). Therefore, this study 
argues that MFI boards are likely to have a high level of diversity. 
5.2 Board Size 
Board size is the number of members on a board. There is a belief that the number of 
directors can affect the performance of a company, especially its financial performance. A 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 8 
number of scholars have contended that larger boards have their benefits and when board size 
increases firm performance also goes up as more board members provide greater monitoring, 
advice and make available better linkages to the external environment (Adams & Mehran, 
2003; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972). 
It is easier for larger boards to monitor their managers’ activities more effectively, but it 
would be difficult for the CEO to control the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1989). Due to the 
complexity of the organisation, the CEO of the organisation needs many advocates (Klein, 
1998). 
In non-profit organisations, when the board has a higher number of trustees, it is easy for 
them to deal with operational issues and wield more control over operating activities (Oster, 
1995). Also, charitable organizations can improve their efficiency with larger boards 
(Tinkelman, 1999). In the MFI studies, Mersland and Strøm (2009) noted that most MFIs 
have a board of seven to nine directors. Bassem (2009) stated that large boards with a range 
of expertise provide better performance for MFIs. However, Yermack (1996) points out larger 
boards are related with lower performance for MFIs. Furthermore, Armendariz and Labie 
(2011) emphasise that it is important for MFIs to select board members with an appropriate 
background who are able and willing to dedicate the time that effective monitoring requires.  
The appropriate number of board members has been a matter of continuing debate and given 
mixed results (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; 
Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). It can be seen that the number of members on a board 
influences firm performance as numbers affect the ability of the board to carry out its 
functions. Therefore, it is important to consider board size for further studies for differently 
structured firms. 
5.3 Independent Directors 
The reason for using this variable is due to the different ideas about the impact of outside 
directors and also to assess the composition of the board. Lorsch and MacIver (1989, p. 17) 
stated that “there has been a growing predominance of outside directors who are there not 
only to provide a new perspective to top management’s thinking, but also to provide the 
necessary oversight only possible from an outsider”. Agency theory is highly concerned 
about board independence and the balance between executive and non-executive directors on 
the board (Bathula, 2008). Lorsch and MacIver (1989) highlighted that 74 per cent of 
directors are from outsiders and among them, 69 per cent are non-management personnel 
with no other contacts with the organisation. Agency theorists highlighted that independent 
boards will increase firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). As illustrated by 
Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008), there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the proportion of outside directors. 
In an MFI context, Hartarska (2005) used rated and unrated MFIs in Eastern Europe to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and MFI success and his results 
show that more independent boards give better return on assets (ROA) whereas lower 
financial performance and outreach showed for the boards with employee directors. Lapenu 
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and Pierret (2006) highlight the tradeoffs between outreach and financial performance of 
MFIs, finding tradeoffs to be influenced by stakeholders’ representation on the board and 
providing strong support for independent boards with limited employee participation. Based 
on the findings stated above, this study argues that MFI boards are likely to have more 
independent stakeholders. 
5.4 CEO/Chairman Duality 
CEO/chairman influence on the board is recognised as CEO/chairman duality, which is one 
of the important practices in corporate governance. Duality is when the roles of CEO and 
chairman are carried out by the same person. Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that firms that 
separate the two functions had improved performance. Agency theoreticians highlighted the 
separation of the role of CEO and chairperson (Dalton et al., 1998; Jensen, 1993; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Jensen (1993) argues that if it is the function of the chair is to hire, fire, 
evaluate and compensate the CEO then this cannot be done when both roles are combined. 
Therefore, the chairperson function must not be under the control of the CEO. CEO duality 
restricts the independence of board and reduces the ability of boards to perform their 
oversight and governance role (Millstein & Katsh, 2003). 
In the MFI context, Mersland and Strøm (2009) state that female CEO and CEO/Chairman 
duality has an influence on financial performance and outreach of MFIs. Further, they 
highlighted that the CEO and the chairman should not be the same person. Therefore, it is 
important to use this characteristic to understand the power of a firm, whether both important 
positions belong to one person or not. If both roles are performed by one person, boards of 
directors will be ineffective in discharging their monitoring duties, as opportunistic behaviour 
by the CEO will reduce firm performance. Thus, the CEO/chairman influence on the board is 
used to clarify the impact on firms’ performance. Similar reasoning can be applied to the 
microfinance industry where CEO/Chairman duality has a negative effect on firm 
performance. 
5.5 Ownership Type 
Many policy papers report that the most appropriate ownership type for MFIs is a shareholder 
firm that can be regulated by the banking authorities and remain independent from donors 
(Christen & Rosenberg, 2000; Hardy, Holden, & Prokopenko, 2003; Jansson, Rosales, & 
Westley, 2004). Such MFIs will be able to benefit from corporate governance due to private 
ownership. This underlines a need to transform non-profit MFIs to for-profit ownerships 
(Ledgerwood & White, 2006). Prior studies have pointed out that most MFIs are now 
commercialising their institutions from non-profit to for-profit as shareholder firms can 
perform better than non-profit organisations (Hardy et al., 2003; Ivatury & Reille, 2004; 
Ledgerwood & White, 2006) and are a solution to provide low-cost credit to greater outreach 
(Varottil, 2012).  
However, in recent MFI studies, Hartarska (2005), Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Sinclair 
(2012) find that the for-profit organisations’ ownership structure does not advance MFIs’ 
performance. Mersland and Strøm (2009) further reveal that ownership of MFIs does not 
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matter for firm performance. However, the relationship between firm performance and 
ownership is ambiguous and needs to be investigated. Based on the recent findings stated 
above, this study emphasised to considers the proportion of majority ownership of the firm; 
whether the MFI is a non-profit organisation, for-profit organisation, member-based 
cooperative, or shareholder-owned firm and which is likely to demonstrate better 
performance. 
5.6 Corporate Mission 
The relationship between firm performance and mission statement has commonly been 
discussed in the strategic planning textbooks but remains unanswered (Bart & Baetz, 1998). 
More focus has been given to identifying the components of the mission statement. Very few 
studies have focused mission statement and firm performance research. Bart, Bontis, and 
Taggar (2001) pointed out that mission statements have a positive relationship with 
performance and can make a positive contribution towards performance. They also express 
that there are intervening variables which need to be considered when assessing the 
relationship between mission statement and performance. Zachary, Dana, and Israel (2008) 
revealed that some Israeli firms with formal and written mission statements demonstrate 
improved performance. 
In MFI related studies, some scholars are highly concerned about the clear definition of social 
goals which help to structure MFI activities to reach more borrowers. Arena (2012) noted that 
MFIs have a problem with drifting away from their mission and it is conceived as a problem 
of corporate governance. Rock et al. (1998) state that it is important for MFIs to define their 
mission clearly and accurately communicate it to the institutional stakeholders, such as 
donors, lenders, staff and clients. Johnson, Malkamaki, and Wanjau (2006) explained how 
donor agencies were focusing on the results that MFIs achieve and were checking whether 
they were connected directly to the goals and objectives of MFIs. However, no studies have 
been conducted on how or the extent to which the mission of MFIs affects the performance of 
MFIs. It is argued that MFIs need to concentrate more on their dual mission, and therefore, it 
is important to consider the relationship between the mission of MFIs and their performance 
in MFI studies. 
5.7 Internal and External Auditors 
Selecting the firm’s auditor is an internal governance mechanism and links with firm 
performance. The internal auditor’s functions offer firms an independent assurance and 
consulting service to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and 
governance processes (Institute of Internal Auditors [IIA], 1999). The execution of internal 
audit functions are highlighted in the prior literature (Antoine, 2004; Goodwin & Kent, 2003; 
McCollum, 2006) and governance reports (IIA Professional Guidance, 2002; New York Stock 
Exchange [NYSE], 2002) as a mechanism for improving a company’s internal governance. If 
internal auditors report directly to the board and they are independent, then there is good 
accountability and transparency available in the firm (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Sinclair, 
2012). This study, therefore, will consider internal auditors as a good corporate governance 
mechanism to enhance MFI performance. 
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Agency theorists note a number of external controls for self-serving agents; among them are 
external audits (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002). The external auditor is considered 
to have an effect on the efficiency of corporate governance. Fan and Wong (2005, p. 37) 
stated that “Our overall results suggest that external auditors play a governance role in East 
Asia”. The monitoring function performed by external auditors is believed to play an 
essential role in ensuring the quality oversight that the companies have achieved in their 
financial reporting practices. Also external auditors can provide an assurance about the 
quality of the accounting information which is publicly reported and bounds the ability to 
extract wealth from outside stakeholders (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; 
Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005). Where a firm conducts external audits or 
reports directly to the board, and whether it issues an audited report, highly affects the 
performance of MFIs. Bassem (2009) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) highlighted that 
audited financial statements improve MFI performance and need to consider for further 
studies. 
5.8 Type of Donors 
The community investment movement has clearly demonstrated that investments offering 
minimal returns but with social value are successful for all stakeholders particularly for the 
microfinance industry. The affordable housing market in USA is such a segment which has 
numerous government incentives for investors, like guarantee funds and the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) to motivate banks. Thus, the proportion of funds received from 
non-governmental institutions and/or foreign funds needs to be evaluated. 
In non-profit organisations, large donors are acting in a similar way to blockholders in 
for-profit organisations by ensuring that the organisation’s resources are used in effective 
manner (de Andrés-Alonso, Romero-Merino, & Cruz, 2006). Large donor funds have their 
own MFIs and actively manage all their MFIs (Sinclair, 2012). Frumkin and Kim (2001) state 
that large donors act like efficient monitors with their skill and power by demanding detailed 
plans, budgets and information for each project. It is important to consider types of donors as 
they represent the vertical relationship with the MFI (Mersland, 2009). 
5.9 Regulatory and Commercial Environment 
Among the external factors, the level of regulation in the microfinance sector and the 
commercial environment influences the manner in which MFIs deal with their performance. 
The current study takes into consideration the country-specific macroeconomic variables such 
as inflation rate, GDP growth rate, banking and financial reforms as these are considered to 
be the external dimension of the firm (Mersland, 2009) and they also affect the performance 
of MFIs (Meyer, 2002; Sinclair, 2012). Bassem (2009) stated that the international ratings 
and external governance mechanisms assist MFIs to reach their financial performance. MFI 
sector needs specific, dedicated and qualified regulators who understand this sector 
particularly (Sinclair, 2012). Further, he stated that the rating agencies reduce due diligence 
expenses and provide more information about the MFI investments.   
Even though a proper regulatory environment can streamline MFI activities, the available 
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evidence indicates that it increases the cost of operation, but it is not clear whether it impacts 
the profitability of MFIs (Cull et al., 2007). Therefore, it is corroborating that the external 
governance mechanism plays a limited role in MFI performance (Hartarska, 2009; Hartarska 
& Nadolnyak, 2007). The inferences arising out of the regulation and commercial 
environment of MFIs cannot be ignored in the governance framework (Varottil, 2012). It is 
argued that better reforms can improve MFI performance (Christen & Rosenberg, 2000; 
Hardy et al., 2003; Jansson et al., 2004; Sinclair, 2012). Based on the related studies, it is 
important for MFIs to have better regulatory and commercial environments to perform their 
activities. 
6. Conclusion  
The major contribution of this study is to introduce significant corporate governance factors 
that influence both the financial performance and outreach of MFIs. Consideration of the 
empirical investigations into the microfinance sector as they relate to corporate governance 
suggests a low general awareness of the impact of corporate governance. Inferences about 
what ought to be done as good governance in MFIs is largely based on analyses of problem 
cases. There have been a few studies conducted for different countries and regions. This study 
will fill the research gap by identifying and developing an appropriate governance structure 
for MFIs, which will enable them to conduct their operations with special reference to the 
social performance of MFIs and poor people.  
Further, this study offers insights for policy makers interested regarding corporate governance 
practices within their country. Relationship between funding and outreach is an example that 
informs donors’ decisions. So the role of board members in extending fiduciary responsibility 
to outreach will be beneficial and may be implemented. Further, this study provides guidance 
for selecting directors for MFI boards based on their academic and professional qualifications. 
For instance, the directors who are having financial qualifications to monitor the financial 
activities of the MFI, a social director who is ensuring that the MFI adheres to its social 
mission and a director representing the borrowers of the MFI; what qualifications should they 
have? 
References 
Aboagye, A. Q., & Otieku, J. (2010). Are Ghanaian MFIs' performance associated with 
corporate governance? Corporate Governance, 10(3), 307-320. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720701011051938  
Adams, R., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is corporate governance different for bank holding 
companies? Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 9(1), 123-142. 
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=795584  
Antoine, R. (2004). Internal audit: Spotlight shines on its new role. Retrieved from 
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x45449.xml  
Arena, T. (2012). Social corporate governance and the problem of mission drift in 
socially-oriented microfinance institutions. Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 13 
41(3), 269-316. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=32798348&site=ehost-liv
e  
Armendariz, B., & Labie, M. (2011). The Handbook of Microfinance. World Scientific 
Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/7645  
Armendáriz de Aghion, B., & Morduch, J. (2004). Microfinance: Where do we stand? , 
135-148. Retrieved from 
http://www.pfsprogram.org/sites/default/files/G3_FAI_WhereWeStand_0.pdf 
Arthur, N., Garvey, G., Swan, P., & Taylor, S. (1993). Agency theory and "management 
research" a comment. Australian Journal of Management, 18(1), 93-102. 
doi:10.1177/031289629301800105  
Barr, M. S., Kumar, A., & Litan, R. E. (2007). Building Inclusive Financial Systems: A 
Framework for Financial Access. Washington, D.C Brookings Institution Press. 
Bart, C. K., & Baetz, M. C. (1998). The relationship between mission statements and firm 
performance: An exploratory study. Journal of Management Studies, 35(6), 823-853. 
doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00121 
Bart, C. K., Bontis, N., & Taggar, S. (2001). A model of the impact of mission statements on 
firm performance. Management Decision, 39(1), 19-35. doi:10.1108/eum0000000005404  
Bassem, B. S. (2009). Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in 
Mediterranean countries. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 10(1), 31-43. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.waikato.ac.nz/10.3846/1611-1699.2009.10.31-43 
Bathula, H. (2008). Board characteristics and firm performance: evidence from New Zealand. 
AUT University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10292/376     
Becker, C. L., Defond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J. J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of 
audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(1), 1-24. 
doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00547.x   
Berenbach, S., & Churchill, C. (1997). Regulation and supervision of microfinance 
institutions Experiences from Latin America Asia and Africa. Washington, D.C.: USAID. 
Retrieved from 
http://centerforfinancialinclusionblog.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/regulation-and-supervisio
n-of-microfinance-institutions.pdf  
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and 
firm performance. Business Lawyer, 54(3), 921-921. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40687871  
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 14 
Brau, J. C., Hiatt, S., & Woodworth, W. (2009). Evaluating impacts of microfinance 
institutions using Guatemalan data. Managerial Finance, 35(12), 953-974. 
doi:10.1108/03074350911000025 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of 
poison pills. Journal of Financial Economics, 35(3), 371-390. 
doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8  
Brown, A., & Gladwell, S. (2009). An update on corporate governance in the wake of the 
credit crisis. Financial Services Quarterly. Retrieved from 
http://www.bellgully.co.nz/newsletters/24financial/FSQ_autumn_2009.pdf 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009). Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-2008. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 77-100. doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.77  
Burke, R. J. (1997). Women on corporate boards of directors: A needed resource. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 16(9), 909-915. doi:10.1023/a:1017987220508  
Calderón, C., & Liu, L. (2003). The direction of causality between financial development and 
economic growth. Journal of Development Economics, 72(1), 321-334. 
doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(03)00079-8 
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board 
diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(1), 33-53. doi:10.1111/1540-6288.00034 
Caudill, S. B., Gropper, D. M., & Hartarska, V. (2009). Which microfinance institutions are 
becoming more cost effective with time? Evidence from a mixture model. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 41(4), 651-672. doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00226.x  
CGAP. (2004). Annual Report 2004. Washington, DC: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
The World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41932/CGAP_Annual_Report_2004.pdf 
Christen, R. P., & Rosenberg, R. (2000). The rush to regulate: Legal frameworks for 
microfinance. CGAP. Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/publications/rush-regulate-legal-frameworks-microfinance  
Chung, K. H., Wright, P., & Kedia, B. (2003). Corporate governance and market valuation of 
capital and R&D investments. Review of Financial Economics, 12(2), 161-172. 
doi:10.1016/s1058-3300(02)00063-0  
Claessens, S. (2006). Competitive implications of cross-border banking. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3854. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922980   
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2002). Corporate governance and the audit 
process. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(4), 573-594. 
doi:10.1506/983m-epxg-4y0r-j9yk  
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 15 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(2), 329-356. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 
CSFI. (2008). Microfinance Banana Skins 2008: Risk in a booming industry. United 
Kingdom: Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI). Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2956/MF_BananaSkins2008.pdf 
Cull, R., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Morduch, J. (2007). Financial performance and outreach: A 
global analysis of leading microbanks. The Economic Journal, 117(517), F107-F133. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02017.x  
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, 
and corporate value: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 
73-100. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005  
Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, D. R. (1999). A decade of corporate women: Some 
progress in the boardroom, none in the executive suite. Strategic Management Journal, 20(1), 
93-99. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199901)20:1<93::AID-SMJ18>3.0.CO;2-7 
Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, D. R. (2000). The future of corporate women: Progress 
toward the executive suite and the boardroom. In R. J. Burke & M. C. Mattis (Eds.), Women 
on corporate boards of directors: International challenges and opportunities. Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1997). Separate, but not independent: Board leadership 
structure in large corporations. Corporate Governance, 5(3), 126-136. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00053 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2003). Women in the boardroom: A business imperative. The 
Journal of Business Strategy, 24(5), 8-9. Retrieved from 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1491470  
Daley-Harris, S. (2006). State of the microcredit summit campaign report 2006. Washington, 
DC: Microcredit summit campaign 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews 
of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 19(3), 269-290. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.3.CO;2-B 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors 
and financial performance: A meta-analysis. The Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 
674-686. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/256988?origin=api   
de Andrés-Alonso, P., Romero-Merino, M. E., & Cruz, N. M. (2006). The governance of 
nonprofit organizations: Empirical evidence from nongovernmental development 
organizations in Spain. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(4), 588-604. 
doi:10.1177/0899764006289765  
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 16 
Erdal, D., Oguzhan, A., & Ahmet, I. (2011). The Direction of Causality between Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Turkey. International Journal of 
Management, 28(1), 3-19. Retrieved from 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/58663016  
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012). Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 
financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 18(2), 389-411. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005  
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & 
Economics, 26, 301-325. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/725104  
Fan, J. P. H., & Wong, T. J. (2005). Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role 
in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(1), 
35-72. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00162.x  
Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards: The effect of gender. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 85-106. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2003.12.001  
Fields, M. A., & Keys, P. Y. (2003). The emergence of corporate governance from Wall St. 
to Main St.: Outside directors, board diversity, earnings management, and managerial 
incentives to bear risk. Financial Review, 38(1), 1-24. oi:10.1111/1540-6288.00032 
Frumkin, P., & Kim, M. T. (2001). Strategic positioning and the financing of nonprofit 
organizations: Is efficiency rewarded in the contributions marketplace? Public Administration 
Review, 61(3), 266-275. doi:10.1111/0033-3352.00029 
Gant, R., de Silva, D., Atapattu, A., & Durrant, S. (2002). National microfinance study of Sri 
Lanka: Survey of practices and policies. Australia: Australian Agency for International 
Development. Retrieved from 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.27354/219.pdf 
Gobezie, G. (2005). Livelihoods through micro-enterprise services? Assessing supply and 
demand constraints for microfinance in Ethiopia (with particular reference to the Amhara 
Region) 3rd International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy (pp. 1-39). Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia: Ethiopian Economic Association June 2-4, 2005. 
Goodwin, J., & Kent, P. (2003). Factors affecting the voluntary use of internal audit, working 
paper University of Queensland, St Lucia/Queensland University of Technology Brisbane, 
Australia.  
Hardy, D. C. D. I. O., Holden, P., & Prokopenko, V. (2003). Microfinance Institutions and 
Public Policy. Policy Reform 
Hartarska, V. (2005). Governance and performance of microfinance institutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states. World Development, 33(10), 
1627-1643. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.06.001  
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 17 
Hartarska, V. (2009). The impact of outside control in microfinance. Managerial Finance, 
35(12), 975-989. doi:10.1108/03074350911000034 
Hartarska, V., & Nadolnyak, D. (2007). Do regulated microfinance institutions achieve better 
sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence. Applied Economics, 39(10), 1207-1222. 
doi:10.1080/00036840500461840  
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review - 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 9(1), 7-26. Retrieved from 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fednep/y2003iaprp7-26nv.9no.1.html  
Hermes, N., & Lensink, R. (2011). Microfinance: Its impact, outreach, and sustainability. 
World Development, 39(6), 875-881. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.10.021  
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. (2002). Women and racial minorities in the 
boardroom: How do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28(6), 747-763. 
doi:10.1016/s0149-2063(02)00192-7 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource dependence role of 
corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental 
change. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 235-256. doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00179 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives. The Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 
383-396. doi:10.2307/30040728 
Hossain, M., Cahan, S. F., & Adams, M. B. (2000). The investment opportunity set and the 
voluntary use of outside directors: New Zealand evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 
30(4), 263-273. Retrieved from 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/bibliographic_databases.htm?id=1349290&  
Houssem, R., & Hassene Ben, M. (2011). The Causality between financial development and 
economic growth: Panel data cointegration and GMM system approaches. International 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(1), 143 - 151. 
Huse, M., & Solberg, A. G. (2006). Gender-related boardroom dynamics: How Scandinavian 
women make and can make contributions on corporate boards. Women in Management 
Review, 21(2), 113-130. doi:10.1108/09649420610650693 
IIA Professional Guidance. (2002). Recommendation for improving corporate governance. 
Internal Auditor, 68 
Institute of Internal Auditors [IIA]. (1999). Definition of International Auditing (The Institute 
of Internal Auditors, Altamonte Springs, Florida). Retrieved from 
http://www.iia.org.uk/en/Knowledge_Centre/global_professional_guidance/Definition.cfm 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 18 
Ivatury, G., & Reille, X. (2004). Foreign Investment in Microfinance: Debt and Equity from 
Quasi-Commercial Investors (Focus Notes: 25). Washington, DC: Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP), The World Bank 
Jansson, T., Rosales, R., & Westley, G. (2004). Principles and practices for regulating and 
supervising microfinance. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank 
Jeanneney, S., Hua, P., & Liang, Z. (2006). Financial development, economic efficiency and 
productivity growth: Evidence from China. The Developing Economies, 44(1), 27-52. 
doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.2006.00002.x 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x 
Johnson, S., Malkamaki, M., & Wanjau, K. (2006). Tackling the ‘frontiers' of microfinance 
in global analysis of leading microbanks. Economic Journal, 117(517), 107-133. 
Kasey, K., Thompson, S., & Wright, M. (1997). Corporate Governance: Economic and 
Financial Issues. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Kathryn, I. (2005). Building inclusive financial sectors: The road to growth and poverty 
reduction. Journal of International Affairs, 58(2), 65-68. 
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How 
the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00318 
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). Finance, entrepreneurship and growth. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 32(3), 513-542. doi:10.1016/0304-3932(93)90028-e 
Kirkpatrick, C., & Maimbo, S. M. (2002). The implications of the evolving microfinance 
agenda for regulatory and supervisory policy. Development Policy Review, 20(3), 293-304. 
doi:10.1111/1467-7679.00172 
Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 41(1), 275-304. doi:10.1086/467391 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400. 
doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 
Kula, V. (2005). The Impact of the Roles, Structure and Process of Boards on Firm 
Performance: evidence from Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 
265-276. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00421.x 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2007). The impact of capital structure on the performance of 
microfinance institutions. The Journal of Risk Finance, 8(1), 56-71. 
doi:10.1108/15265940710721082 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 19 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2006). The relationship between board size board 
composition, CEO duality, and firm performance: experience from Ghana. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, 4(2), 114-122. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Osei, K. A. (2008). Outreach and profitability of microfinance 
institutions: the role of governance. Journal of Economic Studies, 35(3/4), 236-248. 
doi:10.1108/01443580810887797 
Labie, M. (2001). Corporate governance in microfinance organizations: A long and winding 
road. Management Decision, 39(4), 296-301. doi:10.1108/00251740110391466 
Lapenu, C., & Pierret, D. (2006). Handbook for the Analysis of the Governance of 
Microfinance Institutions. IFAD. Retrieved from 
http://www.ifad.org/ruralfinance/pub/handbook.pdf 
Ledgerwood, J., & White, V. (2006). Transforming microfinance institutions: providing full 
financial services to the poor.   
Lorsch, J. W., & MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns Or Potentates: The Reality of America's 
Corporate Boards.  Retrieved from 
http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=ds0T7_5R1N8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_s
ummary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false  
Lynall, M. D., Golden, B. R., & Hillman, A. J. (2003). Board Composition from Adolescence 
to Maturity: A Multitheoretic View. The Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 416-431. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.2003.10196743  
Mattis, M. C. (2000). Women Corporate Directors in the United States. In R. J. Burke & M. 
C. Mattis (Eds.), Women on corporate boards of directors: International challenges and 
opportunities. Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
McCollum, T. (2006). On the road to good governance. The Internal Auditor, 63(5), 40-46. 
Mersland, R. (2009). Corporate governance and ownership in microfinance organizations. 
University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. Retrieved from 
http://brage.bibsys.no/hia/bitstream/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_10691/1/Mersland_Phd_20
09.pdf   
Mersland, R. (2011). The governance of non-profit micro finance institutions: Lessons from 
history. Journal of Management & Governance, 15(3), 327-348. 
doi:10.1007/s10997-009-9116-7 
Mersland, R., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2009). Performance and governance in microfinance 
institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 662-669. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.11.009  
Mersland, R., & Strøm, R. Ø. (2010). Microfinance Mission Drift? World Development, 
38(1), 28-36. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.05.006 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 20 
Meyer, R. L. (2002). Track Record of Financial Institutions in Assisting the Poor in Asia 
(Vol. 49). Tokyo, Japan: Asian development bank institute (ADBI). Retrieved from 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id2284.html   
Milliken, F. J., & Martins, L. L. (1996). Searching for common threads: Understanding the 
multiple effects of diversity in organizational groups. The Academy of Management Review, 
21(2), 402-433. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/258667  
Millstein, I. M., & Katsh, S. M. (2003). The limits of corporate power: Existing constraints 
on the exercise of corporate discretion.  Retrieved from 
http://books.google.co.nz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WySfjuC1oagC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=The
+limits+of+corporate+power:+Existing+constraints+on+the+exercise+of+corporate+discreti
on.&ots=WROIAcB0I2&sig=U912EOVKHG6UeNaJiX24-6QX-Iw   
Ming-Yee, H. (2007). The International Funding of Microfinance Institutions: An Overview. 
LuxFLAG. Retrieved from 
http://www.microfinance.lu/fileadmin/media/Publications/downloads/etudes/MF_intermediat
ion_overview_01.pdf  
Muth, M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency 
approach. Corporate Governance, 6(1), 5-28. doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00076 
New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]. (2002). Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee. New York: NY:  
Oster, S. M. (1995). Strategic Management of Nonprofit Organizations: Theory and Cases.  
Retrieved from 
http://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Management-Nonprofit-Organizations-Theory/dp/019508
5035#reader_0195085035  
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334. 
doi:10.1177/014920638901500208 
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1991). The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: 
Associations with Corporate Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 135-153. 
doi:10.1002/smj.4250120205 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board Monitoring and Earnings 
Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 32(7‐8), 1311-1346. doi:10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00630.x 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization 
and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 218-228. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2393956  
Reille, X., & Forster, S. (2008). Foreign capital investment in microfinance: Balancing social 
and financial returns. Washington, D.C. USA: CGAP. Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2584/FN44.pdf 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 21 
Reille, X., Forster, S., & Rozas, D. (2011). Foreign Capital Investment in Microfinance: 
Reassessing financial and social returns. Washington, DC: Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP). Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/publications/foreign-capital-investment-microfinance  
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the 
non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of 
Management, 16(s1), S5-S26. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00444.x 
Robinson, M. S. (2001). The microfinance revolution:sustainable finance for the poor (pp. 
1-3). Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://people.virginia.edu/~sj8n/research/microfinJELreview.pdf   
Rock, R., Otero, M., & Saltzman, S. (1998). Principles and practices of microfinance 
governance. Bethesda, United States of America: Development Alternatives, Inc. . Retrieved 
from 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/corporategovernance.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Microfinance%2BGo
vernance%2BPractices.pdf/$FILE/Microfinance%2BGovernance%2BPractices.pdf 
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish 
evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 404-413. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00570.x 
Sinclair, H. (2012). Confessions of a microfinance heretic: How microlending lost its way 
and betrayed the poor. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Singh, V., & Vinnicombe, S. (2004). Why so few women directors in top UK boardrooms? 
Evidence and theoretical explanations. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12(4), 479-488. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00388.x 
Smith, N., Smith, V., & Verner, M. (2006). Do women in top management affect firm 
performance?A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms. International Journal of Productivity and 
Performance Management, 55(7), 569-593. doi:10.1108/17410400610702160 
Solomon, J. (2004). Corporate Governance and Accountability (3rd ed.). New York, NY: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Tinkelman, D. (1999). Factors affecting the relation between donations to not-for-profit 
organizations and an efficiency ratio. Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting, 
10(1), 135-161. Retrieved from http://frr.komputerbutut.com/northeast/1999/p35.pdf  
Van den Berghe, L. A. A., & Levrau, A. (2004). Evaluating boards of directors: What 
constitutes a good corporate board? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 
461-478. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00387.x 
Van Gool, J., Verbeke, W., Sercu, P., & Baesens, B. (2012). Credit scoring for microfinance: 
is it worth it? International Journal of Finance & Economics, 17(2), 103-123. 
doi:10.1002/ijfe.444 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN XXXX-XXXX 
2013, Vol. 5, No. 1 
www.macrothink.org/xxx 22 
van Greuning, H., Gallardo, J., & Randhawa, B. (1998). A framework for regulating 
microfinance institutions. Washington, DC: Financial Sector Development Department, The 
World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.25003/2293_file_02293.pdf 
Varottil, U. (2012). Microfinance and the corporate governance conundrum. SSRN Working 
Paper Series(Journal Article) 10.2139/ssrn.1986493. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986493  
Walt, N. v. d., & Ingley, C. (2003). Board dynamics and the influence of professional 
background, gender and ethnic diversity of directors. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 11(3), 218-234. doi:10.1111/1467-8683.00320 
Wan, D., & Ong, C. H. (2005). Board structure, process and performance: Evidence from 
public-listed companies in Singapore. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
13(2), 277-290. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00422.x 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 
Zachary, S., Dana, L., & Israel, D. (2008). Mission statement and performance: An evidence 
of "Coming of Age". Organization Development Journal, 26(2), 49-62. 
 
 
